Rebuttal to DOR’s Statement of Position

The objection was travel time, not physical capability: 108 to 194 minutes with two transfers and a 38-minute walk, to arrive around 7:30 AM for an 8:00 AM training. CCR § 7162 requires evaluating proximity, frequency, and whether the commute creates an undue hardship. The April 29, 2026 administrative review request raised this directly; the May 26 decision did not address it on those terms.

The “least costly” standard in § 7161(c) requires the mode to meet the individual’s needs, not merely be cheapest. DOR’s own SOP concedes that for the June job placement “there were no available public transportation routes that can get him to his job site before his start time.”

Mr. Madden requested vehicle purchase assistance on June 17, 2026, before the rental period began. The June 24 response was an informal email, bundled with an attempt to get him to withdraw his separate mediation/fair hearing request. He refused the withdrawal in writing the same day and demanded the denial in writing. No formal written denial with appeal rights was ever issued.

CCR § 7161.5(a) deems a client financially capable “after the client has received one full month of salary or wages,” which assumes steady, continuous wages. The ABC NorCal registered apprenticeship alternates paid on-the-job training with mandatory, unpaid classroom training. Last paid day: September 11, 2026. No wages received since, through no fault of his own.

Section 7161.5(e) provides: “In no instance shall a case… remain open solely because a client is not financially capable of assuming the cost of transportation.” Where hardship is established, the regulation contemplates continued services, not limbo.

He did plan: the June 17 vehicle purchase request was submitted before the rental period began to prevent exactly this gap.

The review sat open August 10 to October 9 (DOR’s own deadline) with zero authorized transportation from August 15 onward. In that window Mr. Madden paid $1,148.23 out of pocket: a Turo rental September 7–14 ($429.95) and a second Turo rental September 20–October 4 ($718.28), documented with receipts and bank statements provided to DOR.

The “new information” was his answer to DOR’s own questions. The delay reflects DOR’s shifting document demands: his September 1 email documents conflicting requests from different staff, and DOR first required bank statements to verify expenses, then declared bank statements unusable for that purpose.

Mr. Madden never said “I am not employed.” His October 5, 9:57 AM email describes the apprenticeship’s alternating paid and mandatory unpaid phases and states his last paid day was September 11, 2026.

Before the SOP was finalized, DOR received ABC NorCal’s own work report showing 112 hours worked in September 2026 (forwarded October 6, 3:42 PM to Zapanta, Keller, and Somalal), plus two program enrollment emails corroborating the structure he described.

The “not an employee” theory first appears in the record on October 6 at 1:28 PM, in Kamie Zapanta’s email, framed conditionally (“If you are not considered an employee…”), hours after Mr. Madden declined a broad release of his training records. It is DOR’s speculation, not his statement.

Each disclosure was specific, dated, and followed by documentation: living situation (mid-September and October 5), apprenticeship structure (October 5), bank records, paystubs, the DR 233, an income and living expense table, and full billing statements for June through August.

DOR escalated its demands after he answered, including a sweeping release to contact his training program directly. He set a boundary on that release and offered a reasonable alternative: ABC NorCal’s public information line. He asked that communication stay by email because he is unavailable by phone during work hours (8 AM–4 PM), as communicated from the start.

DOR referred Mr. Madden to ABC NorCal. The program’s structure was available to DOR through its own referral relationship.

The May 26 administrative review decision did not address the argument actually made on April 29: that § 7162 requires evaluating proximity, frequency, and undue hardship. Restating the “least costly” conclusion does not answer the hardship argument.

The listed alternatives did not meet his needs, a point DOR itself conceded for the June job placement when it acknowledged no public transit could reach the site before his 7:00 AM start, which is why it authorized the car rental.

The June 24, 2026 vehicle-purchase denial was an informal email. Repeated written requests for a formal denial notice, most recently October 6, 2026, were never answered. 29 U.S.C. § 722(c) requires written notice of review rights upon reduction, suspension, or cessation of services. 9 CCR §§ 7353 and 7354 run appeal clocks from written denials and require written, reasoned decisions with appeal-rights notice.

Zero authorized transportation from August 15 to October 9 while the hardship review sat open. 34 C.F.R. § 361.57(b)(4) prohibits suspending services while a review is pending. 9 CCR § 7351 makes agency inaction independently appealable.

The SOP’s “reported that he is not employed” finding cites no evidence. Topanga, 11 Cal.3d 506, requires findings to bridge the gap between evidence and decision.

The June 24 “Withdrawal of mediation and fair hearing request” email was never requested. The June 16 DR 107 sought both mediation and a fair hearing. He rejected the withdrawal in writing the same day. 9 CCR § 7353.6 confirms the two run concurrently.